

# Improving fairness in online learning

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# Collaborators and references



A unified approach to fair online learning via Blackwell approachability

E. Chzhen, C. Giraud, G. Stoltz; NeurIPS 2021 (spotlight).

Small Total-Cost Constraints in CBwK, with Application to Fairness

E. Chzhen, C. Giraud, Z. Li, G. Stoltz; NeurIPS 2023

Parameter-free projected gradient descent

E. Chzhen, C. Giraud, G. Stoltz; arXiv:2305.19605

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The price of unfairness in linear bandits with biased feedback

S. Gaucher, A. Carpentier, C. Giraud; NeurIPS 2022.

# Fairness in Machine Learning: a major societal concern

Machine Learning is ubiquitous in daily life, and it is used for sensitive decisions such as

- admission in university,
- bank loan,
- job recruitment,
- justice decision,
- ...

# Promises of ML in decision-making

## Promises of ML in decision-making

ML can be more objective and more fair than humans, as algorithms can

- incorporate more data, and more factors in a complex analysis,
- and are not subject to personal biases, tiredness, emotional factors, etc

# Actuality of ML decision-making

## Discriminations also happen in ML prediction

Many ML systems have been shown to produce unfair outcomes.

## Some famous past examples:

- **Hiring AI** from Amazon was discriminating against female candidate on some jobs
- **Google Ad** was proposing higher-paying executive jobs more likely to men than women
- **COMPAS** was falsely predicting recidivism twice more likely for African-American than for Caucasian-American.

# Where does the unfairness come from?

## Main potential causes of unfairness in data science

- [intentional discrimination]
- **historical biases in learning datasets**
- inadvertent bias in evaluations (biased proxy)
- inadvertent bias from data sampling: learning dataset not representative of the target population
- **inadvertent bias from algorithm objectives: focus on the benefit for majority group**

# How can we mitigate these issues?

**This talk:** some possible directions for improving fairness in online learning

- ① Causal Fairness
- ② Statistical Fairness
  - ▶ Adversarial setting
  - ▶ Stochastic setting



# Contextual online setting

## Covariate and sensitive attribute

Each request is characterized by a covariate  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  (observed) and a sensitive attribute  $s \in \{-1, +1\}$  (observed or not).

## Informal description of a typical setting

At each epoch  $t = 1, 2, \dots$

- The Learner observes a context  $(x_t, s_t)$  or  $x_t$  only
- The Learner performs an action (or prediction)  $a_t$
- The Learner observes a feedback  $y_t$  and suffers a regret  $r_t$  (stochastic or adversarial)

## Goal of the learner

To minimize the cumulative regret  $\sum_t r_t$ , while complying to some fairness criteria (and possibly some other constraints).

# 1- A causal point of view

# Causal fairness: identifying causes of unfairness

## Causal fairness: general principle

- The relations between attributes ( $X, S$ ) and their influence on feedback  $Y$  is modeled by structural equations
- The objective is to remove all discriminatory influences of sensitive attribute on the action/prediction

## Example: No unresolved discrimination

Design an action/prediction such that no path from the sensitive attribute to the action exists, except via non-discriminatory variables (resolving variables).

**Caveat:** the notions of causal fairness heavily rely on the causal model. The accuracy of this model is critical, and learning it can be problematic.

# A very (not so) simple case

*The price of unfairness in linear bandits with biased feedback*

S. Gaucher, A. Carpentier, C. Giraud; NeurIPS 2022.

## Biased linear feedbacks

- **biased** feedback


$$y_t = \mathbf{x}_t^\top \boldsymbol{\beta}^* + \mathbf{s}_t^\top \mathbf{b}^* + \xi_t$$

- **unobserved** regret

$$r_t = \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \mathbf{x}^\top \boldsymbol{\beta}^* - \mathbf{x}_t^\top \boldsymbol{\beta}^*,$$

with  $\boldsymbol{\beta}^*$  and  $\mathbf{b}^*$  unknown.

**Resolving variables:** all  $\mathbf{x}_t$



## Price for learning the bias

- **Worst case:** the minimax regret scales as  $T^{2/3}$  instead of  $\sqrt{T}$  for the unbiased case
- **Asymptotic regret:** scales as  $\Delta^{-2} \log(T)$  instead of  $\Delta^{-1} \log(T)$  in some cases.

## 2- Statistical fairness

# Statistical fairness

## General principle

To comply to some fairness criteria at the sub-population level (statistical notions)

## Example 1: equalized Odds

$$A \perp\!\!\!\perp S \mid Y$$

- Equalized Odds encodes a notion of meritocracy
- There are many variants

**Caveat:** strongly subject to biases in learning datasets

# Statistical fairness: Demographic parity

## Example 2: Demographic parity

$$A \perp\!\!\!\perp S$$

Demographic parity promotes *diversity* and can be related to affirmative action policies.

**Caveat:** the feedback  $Y$  is not taken into account

# And many other fairness criteria...

## A large zoology

Demographic parity	$F \perp\!\!\!\perp S$
Equalized odds	$F \perp\!\!\!\perp S   Y$
Equal opportunity	$F \perp\!\!\!\perp S   Y \in \mathcal{Y}_+$
Predictive parity	$Y \in \mathcal{Y}_+ \perp\!\!\!\perp S   F \in \mathcal{Y}_+$
Group-wise calibration	$\mathbb{E}[Y S, F] \cong F$
Equal group-wise risk	$\mathbb{E}[\ell(Y, F) S] \cong \mathbb{E}[\ell(Y, F)]$
...	...



# Finding a balance between different notions

## Relaxing fairness criteria

- Fairness criteria are imperfect mathematical transposition of qualitative ideas;
- Evaluations of fairness criteria are subjected to uncertainties;
- Some fairness criteria are incompatible;

so, it is wise to

- introduce some quantitative measures of violation of the fairness criteria;
- seek for a good trade-off between different fairness criteria and regret (Pareto frontier).

# An instantiation in online learning

## Fairness cost

Fairness criteria can be encoded as vector valued cost constraints.

## Example: demographic parity

The empirical demographic parity criteria (for  $a_t \in \{0, 1\}$ )

$$\left| \frac{1}{p_1 T} \sum_{t \leq T; s_t=1} a_t - \frac{1}{p_{-1} T} \sum_{t \leq T; s_t=-1} a_t \right| = \tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$$

can be encoded as

$$\sum_{t \leq T} c_t = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) \quad \text{with} \quad c_t := \begin{bmatrix} a_t s_t / p_{s_t} \\ -a_t s_t / p_{s_t} \end{bmatrix}.$$

# Our contributions

## Informal objective

$$\min_{\sum_{t \leq T} c_t \leq \tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})} \sum_{t \leq T} r_t.$$

## Two points of view

### 1 In adversarial setting:

- ▶ the fair learning problem can be formulated as a contextual approachability problem,
- ▶ Blackwell theory can be adapted to handle this setting.

### 2 In stochastic bandit setting:

- ▶ the fairness objective falls into the Contextual Bandit with Knapsack (CBwK) framework,
- ▶ the theory for CBwK must be improved to handle  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$  constraints (and signed cost).

# Adversarial Setting :

a Contextual Blackwell Approachability Perspective

*A unified approach to fair online learning via Blackwell approachability.*

E. Chzhen, C. Giraud, G. Stoltz; NeurIPS 2021 (spotlight).

# Online learning setting: formal description

We model our fair online learning problem as a contextual learning game between the Learner and Nature.

## Stochastic attributes (context)

At each time  $t$ , the attributes  $(x_t, s_t)$  are sampled according to  $\mathbf{Q}$ , independently from the past.

## Nature (un)awareness

Let  $G$  denotes Nature (un)awareness mapping

- Nature *awareness*  $G(x, s) = (x, s)$ ,
- Nature *unawareness*:  $G(x, s) = x$ .

## Nature is an adverse player

At each time  $t$ , Nature observes  $G(x_t, s_t)$  and outputs an adversarial feedback  $y_t$ .

# Fair online learning as a contextual approachability problem

## Encoding the objectives of the learner

We can encode the learning objectives (vanishing-regret, demographic parity, etc) via

- a vector-valued payoff function  $\mathbf{m}(a_t, y_t, x_t, s_t)$
- and a target set  $\mathcal{C}$ .

The learning objective is to comply to  $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{m}(a_t, y_t, x_t, s_t) \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ .

## Examples of targets (to be combined)

Criterion	Vector payoff function $\mathbf{m}$	Closed convex target set $\mathcal{C}$
Demographic parity	$\mathbf{m}_{\text{DP}}(a, s) = (\frac{a}{p-1} \mathbf{1}_{s=-1}, \frac{a}{p_1} \mathbf{1}_{s=1})$	$\mathcal{C}_{\text{DP}} = \{(u, v) \in \mathbb{R}^2 :  u - v  \leq \delta\}$
No-regret	$\mathbf{m}_{\text{reg}}(a, y, x, s) = (f(a, y, x, s) - f(a', y, x, s))_{a' \in \mathcal{A}}$	$\mathcal{C}_{\text{reg}} = [0, +\infty)^N$
Group-calibration	$\mathbf{m}_{\text{gr-cal}}(a, y, s) = ((a' - y) \mathbf{1}_{s=s'} / \gamma_{s'})_{a' \in \mathcal{A}, s' \in \mathcal{S}}$	$\mathcal{C}_{\text{gr-cal}} = \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^{N \mathcal{S} } : \ \mathbf{v}\ _1 \leq \varepsilon\}$
Equalized payoffs	$\mathbf{m}_{\text{eq-pay}}(a, y, x, s) = (\frac{f(a, y, x, s')}{\gamma_{s'}} \mathbf{1}_{s=s'})_{s' \in \mathcal{S}}$	$\mathcal{C}_{\text{eq-pay}} = \{(u, v) \in \mathbb{R}^2 :  u - v  \leq \varepsilon\}$

# Online learning setting

## Learning setting

**For**  $t = 1, 2, \dots$

- ❶ Simultaneously,
  - ▶ the Learner chooses  $(\mathbf{p}_t^x)_{x \in \mathcal{X}}$  based on  $(\mathbf{m}_\tau, x_\tau, s_\tau)_{\tau \leq t-1}$
  - ▶ Nature chooses  $(\mathbf{q}_t^{G(x,s)})_{(x,s) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{S}}$  based on  $(a_\tau, y_\tau, x_\tau, s_\tau)_{\tau \leq t-1}$
- ❷  $(x_t, s_t)$  are sampled according to  $\mathbf{Q}$ , independently from the past
- ❸ Simultaneously
  - ▶ the Learner observes  $x_t$ , and picks an action  $a_t \in \mathcal{A}$  according to  $\mathbf{p}_t^{x_t}$
  - ▶ Nature observes  $G(x_t, s_t)$ , and picks  $y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$  according to  $\mathbf{q}_t^{G(x_t, s_t)}$
- ❹ The Learner observes the payoff  $\mathbf{m}_t = \mathbf{m}(a_t, y_t, x_t, s_t)$  and  $(x_t, s_t)$ , while Nature observes  $(a_t, y_t, x_t, s_t)$ .

**Aim:** The Learner wants to ensure that  $\bar{\mathbf{m}}_T := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{m}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$  a.s. for some target set  $\mathcal{C}$ .

# Online learning setting

## Learning setting

**For**  $t = 1, 2, \dots$

① Simultaneously,

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②  $(x_t, s_t)$  are sampled according to  $\mathbf{Q}$ , independently from the past

③ Simultaneously

- ▶ the Learner observes  $x_t$ , and picks an action  $a_t \in \mathcal{A}$  according to  $\mathbf{p}_t^{x_t}$
- ▶ Nature observes  $G(x_t, s_t)$ , and picks  $y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$  according to  $\mathbf{q}_t^{G(x_t, s_t)}$

④ The Learner observes the payoff  $\mathbf{m}_t = \mathbf{m}(a_t, y_t, x_t, s_t)$  and  $(x_t, s_t)$ , while Nature observes  $(a_t, y_t, x_t, s_t)$ .

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**Aim:** The Learner wants to ensure that  $\bar{\mathbf{m}}_T := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{m}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$  a.s. for some target set  $\mathcal{C}$ .

## Assumption: fast enough sequential estimation of $\mathbf{Q}$

The Player can build estimators  $(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t)_{t \geq 1}$  of the unknown distribution  $\mathbf{Q}$  such that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \text{TV}^2(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t, \mathbf{Q}) \right] \leq c (\log(t))^{-3} \quad \forall t \geq 2 \quad (1)$$

## Theorem : Contextual Blackwell approachability

If  $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$  is closed convex,  $\mathbf{m}$  is bounded, and (1) is satisfied, then

$\exists (\mathbf{p}_t^x)_{x \in \mathcal{X}, t \geq 1}$  such that  $\forall (\mathbf{q}_t^{G(x,s)})_{(x,s) \in \mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}, t \geq 1}$  we have  $\bar{\mathbf{m}}_T \xrightarrow{a.s.} \mathcal{C}$

**if and only if**  $\forall (\mathbf{q}^{G(x,s)})_{(x,s) \in \mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}} \exists (\mathbf{p}^x)_{x \in \mathcal{X}}$  such that

$$\mathbf{m}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) := \int_{\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{S}} \mathbf{m}(\mathbf{p}^x, \mathbf{q}^{G(x,s)}, x, s) d\mathbf{Q}(x, s) \in \mathcal{C}$$

## Contextual Blackwell strategy

Set  $\mathbf{m}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}, \hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t) := \int \mathbf{m}(\mathbf{p}^x, \mathbf{q}^{G(x,s)}, x, s) d\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t(x, s)$ . At stage  $t + 1$ , choose

$$(\mathbf{p}_{t+1}^x)_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \in \operatorname{argmin}_{(\mathbf{p}^x)_x} \max_{(\mathbf{q}^{G(x,s)})_{x,s}} \langle \bar{\mathbf{m}}_t - \Pi_{\mathcal{C}} \bar{\mathbf{m}}_t, \mathbf{m}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}, \hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t) \rangle$$

# Caveats

## Caveat 1: the target set $\mathcal{C}$ has to be known

The results can be extended (at the price of some technicalities) to the case where we only have a consistent super-estimate  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}_t$  of  $\mathcal{C}$ .

## Caveat 2: computational cost of projection

Computing the projection  $\Pi_{\mathcal{C}}$  can be computationally expensive.

## Caveat 3: pessimistic Pareto frontier and slow rates

- The adversarial setting leads to pessimistic Pareto frontier (trade-off) between the different criteria;
- The rates are governed by the estimation rate  $\text{TV}(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t, \mathbf{Q})$ , which is typically slow outside the finite case.

# Stochastic setting:

A Contextual Bandit with Knapsack perspective

*Small Total-Cost Constraints in CBwK, with Application to Fairness*

E. Chzhen, C. Giraud, Z. Li, G. Stoltz; NeurIPS 2023

# Stochastic setting

## Learning problem

- The learner observes  $\tilde{x}_t = (x_t, s_t) \stackrel{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} \mathbf{Q}$
- The learner chooses a policy  $\pi_t : \tilde{\mathcal{X}} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$ , and picks an action  $a_t \sim \pi_t(\tilde{x}_t)$ ,
- The learner receives a feedback  $y_t$  and a fairness cost  $c_t$  such that

$$\mathbb{E}[y_t | \mathcal{F}_t] = f(\tilde{x}_t, a_t) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}[c_t | \mathcal{F}_t] = c(\tilde{x}_t, a_t).$$

- The learner suffers a regret  $r_t = \text{OPT} - y_t$  (described below).

## Example: Demographic Parity

$$c(\tilde{x}_t, a_t) = \begin{bmatrix} a_t s_t / p_{s_t} \\ -a_t s_t / p_{s_t} \end{bmatrix}.$$

# Optimal policy and regret

## Optimal static policy and regret

The optimal static feedback is

$$\text{OPT}(\mathbf{Q}, f, c) := \max_{\pi : \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}}[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} c(\tilde{X}, a) \pi_a(\tilde{X})] \leq \delta_T} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}} \left[ \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} f(\tilde{X}, a) \pi_a(\tilde{X}) \right]$$

and the regret is

$$r_t = \text{OPT}(\mathbf{Q}, f, c) - y_t.$$

## Learning Objective

Minimize the cumulative regret  $\sum_{t \leq T} r_t$  while complying to the fairness

constraint  $\sum_{t \leq T} c_t \leq T\delta_T$  (w.h.p.).

# Fairness as CBwK

## CBwK problem

- 1 we recognize a Contextual Bandit with Knapsack (CBwK) problem
- 2 but state of the art theory can only handle  $\delta_T = T^{-1/4}$  (or  $\mathcal{X}$  finite), which is too large for fairness constraints, where we typically wish to have  $\delta_T = \tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$

# Learning assumption

## Assumption: UCB and LCB

We can built UCB and LCB such that with probability  $\geq 1 - \delta$

$$\hat{f}_t^{\text{UCB}}(.,.) \approx f(.,.) + \tilde{O}_{\delta}(1/\sqrt{t})$$

$$\hat{c}_t^{\text{LCB}}(.,.) \approx c(.,.) + \tilde{O}_{\delta}(1/\sqrt{t})$$

## Examples

**Linear or logistic model** : when

$$f(x, a) = \eta(\varphi(x, a)^T \theta_a) \quad \text{and} \quad c(x, a) = \eta(\psi(x, a)^T \beta_a),$$

with  $\eta(u) = u$  or  $\eta(u) = e^u / (1 + e^u)$ , we can use variant of LinUCB or LogisticUCB1.



# A first idea

## Idea1: playing empirical optimal static policy

Choose  $a_t$  according to a policy  $\hat{\pi}_t$  maximizing  $\text{OPT}(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t, \hat{f}_t^{\text{UCB}}, \hat{c}_t^{\text{LCB}})$ .

## Issues

- 1 The analysis of

$$\text{OPT}(\mathbf{Q}, f, c) - \text{OPT}(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t, \hat{f}_t^{\text{UCB}}, \hat{c}_t^{\text{LCB}})$$

produces some  $\text{TV}(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t, \mathbf{Q})$  terms, leading to slow rates / large fairness violation.

- 2 Solving  $\text{OPT}(\hat{\mathbf{Q}}_t, \hat{f}_t^{\text{UCB}}, \hat{c}_t^{\text{LCB}})$  is computationally expensive

# Lagrangian version

## Lagrangian formulation

$$\begin{aligned}\text{OPT}(\mathbf{Q}, f, c) &= \max_{\pi : \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}}[\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} c(\tilde{X}, a) \pi_a(\tilde{X})] \leq \delta_T} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}} \left[ \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} f(\tilde{X}, a) \pi_a(\tilde{X}) \right] \\ &= \max_{\pi} \min_{\lambda \geq 0} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}} \left[ \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_a(\tilde{X}) \left( f(\tilde{X}, a) - \langle \lambda, c(\tilde{X}, a) - \delta_T \rangle \right) \right] \\ \text{strong duality} \rightarrow &= \min_{\lambda \geq 0} \max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}} \left[ \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi_a(\tilde{X}) \left( f(\tilde{X}, a) - \langle \lambda, c(\tilde{X}, a) - \delta_T \rangle \right) \right] \\ &= \min_{\lambda \geq 0} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}} \left[ \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ f(\tilde{X}, a) - \langle \lambda, c(\tilde{X}, a) - \delta_T \rangle \right\} \right]\end{aligned}$$

## Two immediate benefits

- 1 for a fixed  $\lambda$  the problem is separable, and  $\mathbf{Q}$  can be forgotten;
- 2 we only need to learn the optimal  $\lambda^* \in \mathbb{R}^d \implies$  parametric rates. ☺

# High-level algorithm: Primal-dual descent-ascent

## Iterate

- **full optimisation on primal variable:** pick

$$a_t \in \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ \hat{f}_t(\tilde{x}_t, a) - \langle \lambda_{t-1}, \hat{c}_t(\tilde{x}_t, a) - \delta_T \rangle \right\}$$

- **projected subgradient step on dual variable:** update

$$\lambda_t = (\lambda_{t-1} + \gamma (\hat{c}_t(\tilde{x}_t, a_t) - \delta_T))_+$$

## Issues

- 1 **Benign issue:** we must replace  $\delta_T$  by  $\delta'_T = \delta_T - \tilde{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$  to prevent from violation of the fairness criteria due to random fluctuations
- 2 **Major issue:** to satisfy the constraints, we need to set  $\gamma \approx \|\lambda^*\|/\sqrt{T}$



# Choice of step size $\gamma$

## Bounds (informal)

For a fixed step size  $\gamma > 0$ , we have w.h.p.

- $\|\text{constraint violation}\| = \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{T} + \frac{1 \vee \|\lambda^*\|}{\gamma}\right)$
- $\text{Regret} = \tilde{O}\left(\gamma T + \|\lambda^*\| \sqrt{T}\right).$

So best  $\gamma$  is  $\gamma^* = (1 \vee \|\lambda^*\|)/\sqrt{T}$ :

- $\|\text{constraint violation}\| = \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{T}\right)$
- $\text{Regret} = \tilde{O}\left((1 \vee \|\lambda^*\|)\sqrt{T}\right).$

## Mispecified $\gamma$

If we simply set  $\gamma = 1/\sqrt{T}$ , then we have

$$\|\text{constraint violation}\| = \tilde{O}\left((1 \vee \|\lambda^*\|)\sqrt{T}\right) \quad \text{☹️}$$

# Tuning $\gamma$

## Good old doubling trick

- Start from  $\gamma = 1/\sqrt{T}$
- Tracking the constraint violation at each epoch  $t$ , we can detect from the bound

$$\|\text{constraint violation}\| = \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{t} + \frac{1 \vee \|\lambda_*\|}{\gamma}\right)$$

if our current choice of  $\gamma$  is too small

- If so, double  $\gamma$ .

# Adaptive algorithm

## Adaptive version

**Iterate:** for  $t \geq 1$

- Pick  $a_t \in \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ \hat{f}_t(\tilde{x}_t, a) - \langle \lambda_{t-1}, \hat{c}_t(\tilde{x}_t, a) - \delta'_T \rangle \right\}$
- Update  $\lambda_t = \left( \lambda_{t-1} + \frac{2^k}{\sqrt{T}} (\hat{c}_t(\tilde{x}_t, a_t) - \delta'_T) \right)_+$

**Until**  $\left\| \left( \sum_{\tau=T_k}^t c_\tau - (t - T_k + 1) \delta'_T \right)_+ \right\| > \tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$

**Then:** increase  $k$  by one, set  $T_k = t + 1$ , and **iterate** again.

# Theory

## Regret bound

For  $\delta_T \geq \tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$ , the above algorithm fulfills with probability at least  $1 - \delta$

$$\sum_{t \leq T} r_t \leq \tilde{O}_\delta \left( (1 \vee \|\lambda^*\|) \sqrt{T} \right) \quad \sum_{t \leq T} c_t \leq \delta_T T.$$

**Suitable** for fairness constraints 😊

## Optimality?

A proof scheme suggests that this regret is optimal.

# Concluding remarks

- Fairness in decision-making is an important topic;
- The statistical community has an important role to play for providing
  - ▶ conceptual ideas
  - ▶ competitive algorithms with provable performances
  - ▶ theoretical insights
  - ▶ **education of the next generation of data scientists**