

# ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS FOR THE RANK DECODING PROBLEM

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**1** NIST call for Post-Quantum cryptography

2 Algebraic Modeling

3 Complexity estimates

4 Examples

5 Rank metric codes

6 MinRank

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
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# CODING THEORY

- ▶ A linear code = a linear subspace of  $\mathbb{F}_q^N$ , length  $N$ , dimension  $K$ .
- ▶ Generator matrix =  $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{K \times N}$ .
- ▶ Parity-check matrix =  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(N-K) \times N}$  such that  $\mathbf{GH}^\top = \mathbf{0}$ .
- ▶  $\mathbb{F}_q^N$  equipped with a **distance**.


## ERROR CORRECTION



Minimal distance  $d$ , correction capacity  $r \leq \frac{d-1}{2}$ .  
Nearest neighbor decoding.



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## Key generation

- ▶ Public key: a generator matrix  $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$  of a code  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathbf{x}\mathbf{G} : \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k\} \subset \mathbb{F}_q^n$ ,  
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## Message encryption

- ▶ message  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ ,  $\mathbf{e} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_q^n$  of weight  $r$ .
- ▶ ciphertext  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{e}$ .

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## Message decryption

- ▶ apply the decoding algorithm to decode  $\mathbf{y}$  to  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}\mathbf{G}$ , output  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ .

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- ▶ equivalent formulation: given  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$  recover  $\mathbf{e}$  such that  $\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{eH}^\top = \mathbf{yH}^\top$ .  
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→ **Niederreiter** cryptosystem.
- ▶ **Decoding Problem** or **Syndrome Decoding Problem** are equivalent.
- ▶ usual distance = **Hamming distance**

$$d(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}') = \#\{i : c_i \neq c'_i\}.$$

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- ▶ Interactive Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that you know  $\mathbf{e}$  without revealing any information on  $\mathbf{e}$ . Use of Random challenges.
- ▶ **Fiat-Shamir transform**: non-interactive proof, challenges are computed from the message to be signed using a hash function.



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| Prover  | Verifier  |
|---|---|
| $\pi \xleftarrow{\$} \mathfrak{S}_n, \mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_q^k$<br>commit to $\begin{cases} c_1 = \mathcal{H}(\pi, \mathbf{u}\mathbf{H}^\top), \\ c_2 = \mathcal{H}(\pi(\mathbf{u})), \\ c_3 = \mathcal{H}(\pi(\mathbf{e} + \mathbf{u})) \end{cases}$ |   |
| reveal $\begin{cases} i = 1 & \mathbf{v} = \pi(\mathbf{e}), \mathbf{w} = \pi(\mathbf{u}) \\ i = 2 & \pi, \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{u} \\ i = 3 & \pi, \mathbf{u} \end{cases}$   | $i \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, 2, 3\}$<br>check $\begin{cases} i = 1 & c_2, c_3, w(\mathbf{v}) = r \\ i = 2 & c_3, c_1 \text{ with } \mathbf{z}\mathbf{H}^\top - \mathbf{s}. \\ i = 3 & c_1, c_2. \end{cases}$ |

# RANK METRIC DELSARTE 1978

Codes over  $\mathbb{F}_q^{mn}$  when  $N = mn$

- ▶ A word  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_{mn}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{mn}$  is viewed as a (column) matrix

$$\mathbf{X} = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 & \dots & x_{m(n-1)+1} \\ x_2 & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_m & \dots & x_{mn} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}.$$

- ▶ The rank distance  $d(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}) = \text{Rank}(\mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{X})$ .

# MATRIX CODES AND RANK DISTANCE

## Example 1

▶  $\mathbf{x} = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{20}$ .

▶  $\text{Mat}(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{4 \times 5}$

▶ The weight of  $\mathbf{x}$  is 3.

## RANK METRIC GABIDULIN 1985

Equivalent definition for Matrix codes over  $\mathbb{F}_q^{nm} \leftrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$

- ▶ Finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , extension  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ , basis  $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_m)$  as an  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -vector space.

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▶  $\mathbf{x} = (1 + \alpha^2, 1 + \alpha, \alpha + \alpha^3, \alpha^2 + \alpha^3, 1 + \alpha^3) \leftrightarrow \text{Mat}(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{4 \times 5}$

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- ▶ Rank weight  $|\mathbf{x}| = \text{Rank}(\text{Mat}(\mathbf{x})) = \dim(\langle \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_q})$ , support.

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  - ▶  $|\mathbf{x}| = 3$ , the support of  $\mathbf{x}$  is  $\mathcal{V} = \langle 1 + \alpha^2, 1 + \alpha, \alpha + \alpha^3 \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_q}$ .

## INTERESTING CODES IN RANK METRIC

General Matrix codes are  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -linear codes (Delsarte 1978)

They are  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -linear sub-spaces of  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n = \mathbb{F}_q^{mn} = \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ , endowed with the rank metric.

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Particular Matrix codes specified as  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear codes (Gabidulin 1985)

They are  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear sub-spaces of  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ , endowed with the rank metric.

- ▶  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear codes are particular matrix codes with a **structure**,
- ▶ Known families of  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear codes with **decoding algorithms**,
- ▶  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear codes have a much shorter description (save a factor  $m$ )  
⇒ **Shorter** public keys in cryptography!

## SPECIFIC FAMILY OF CODES

$\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear codes in rank metric:  $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$  has an additional structure

|                 | $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear code                         | Matrix code in $\mathbb{F}_q^{nm}$                |
|-----------------|---|---|
| Field           | $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$                                      | $\mathbb{F}_q$                                    |
| Length          | $n$   | $nm$  |
| Dimension       | $k$   | $km$  |
| Codeword        | $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ | matrix $\mathbf{X} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ |
| Size of a basis | $knm \log(q)$   | $kmnm \log(q)$                                    |

# THE RANK DECODING PROBLEM (RD)

## Rank Decoding Problem (RD)

- ▶ Input: an integer  $r \in \mathbb{N}$ , an  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -basis  $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{k \times n}$  of a subspace  $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ , and a vector  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$  such that  $d(\mathbf{y}, \mathcal{C}) \leq r$ .
- ▶ Output:  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$  such that

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## Syndrome formulation

$\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{yH}^\top$ ,  $\mathbf{y}$  one solution of  $\mathbf{yH}^\top = \mathbf{s}$  without constraints on the weight of  $\mathbf{y}$ .

Given  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{n-k}$  and  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{(n-k) \times n}$ , find  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$  such that

$$\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{eH}^\top \text{ and } \text{Rank}(\mathbf{e}) \leq r.$$



# MINRANK PROBLEM = MATRIX CODE DECODING PROBLEM

## Computational MinRank (affine)

- ▶ Input: integers  $r, m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ , and  $K = k + 1$  matrices  $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{M}_1, \dots, \mathbf{M}_k \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$
- ▶ Output:  $(x_1, \dots, x_k) \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , such that

$$\text{Rank} \left( \mathbf{Y} + \sum_{i=1}^k x_i \mathbf{M}_i \right) \leq r.$$

# HARDNESS OF MINRANK AND RD

Hardness of the decoding for  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -linear matrix codes

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## Hardness of the decoding for $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ -linear codes

- ▶ RD is not “a priori” NP-hard.
- ▶ DP (Decoding problem, Hamming metric)  $\leq_{\text{randomized}}$  RD ( $m > n^2$ ) (Gaborit and Zémor 2016)
- ▶ RD  $\leq$  MinRank. (J.-C. Faugère, Levy-dit-Vehel, and Perret 2008).

# RANK-METRIC CODE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY

Signature schemes (authentication protocols) submitted to the NIST competition

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MinRank is also used to cryptanalyse multivariate (e.g. Rainbow, GeMSS, UOV) or code-based schemes (e.g. McEliece).

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$$\text{Cost } q^{ar} \mathbb{C}_{RD}(m, n - a, k - a, r).$$

# ALGEBRAIC MODELING FOR RD

RD instance:  $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{k \times n}$  public matrix,  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$  such that  $d(\mathbf{y}, \mathcal{C}) \leq r$ ,  
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- ▶ find  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^k$  such that  $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{y}$  and  $\text{Rank}(\mathbf{e}) \leq r$ .

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- ▶ find  $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{r \times n}$  such that  $\mathbf{CH}_y^\top$  has a non-trivial left kernel. (Bardet, Bros, Cabarcas, et al. 2020).



# MAXMINORS MODELING

Algebraic Modeling Bardet, Bros, Cabarcas, et al. 2020

$$\text{MaxMinors}(\mathbf{C}\mathbf{H}_y^\top) = \left\{ P_J := \left| \mathbf{C}\mathbf{H}_y^\top \right|_{*,J} : J \subset \{1..n-k-1\}, \#J = r \right\}.$$

- ▶  $\binom{n-k-1}{r}$  equations over  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$  of degree  $r$ ,
  - ▶  $rn$  variables  $c_{i,j}$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .
  - ▶ a lot of solutions:
    - ▶  $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{C}$  is a solution for any  $\mathbf{A} \in GL_r(\mathbb{F}_q)$ .
    - ▶ any  $\mathbf{C}$  of rank  $< r$  is solution
- look for  $\mathbf{C} = (\mathbf{I}_r \mathbf{C}')$ ,  $r(n-r)$  variables.

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► Cauchy-Binet formula:  $\det(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{B}) = \sum_T \det(\mathbf{A}_{*,T}) \det(\mathbf{B}_{T,*})$ .

$$P_J = \sum_{T \subset \{1..n\}, \#T=r} |\mathbf{C}|_{*,T} |\mathbf{H}_y|_{J,T}$$

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- ▶ Plücker coordinates ( $N = \binom{n}{r} - 1$ ): injective map, easy to invert on its image.

$$p : \{\mathcal{W} \subset \mathbb{F}_q^n : \dim(\mathcal{W}) = r\} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}^N(\mathbb{F}_q)$$

$$\mathbf{C} \text{ generator matrix of } \mathcal{W} \mapsto (|\mathbf{C}|_{*,T})_{T \subset \{1..n\}, \#T=r}$$

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- ▶ **spurious** solutions: solutions over  $\overline{\mathbb{F}_q}$  or outside the image of the Plücker map.
- ▶ **Unfolding** =  $m$  times more equations over  $\mathbb{F}_q$

$$\sum_{T \subset \{1..n\}, \#T=r} |\mathbf{C}|_{*,T} |\mathbf{H}_y|_{J,T}^{q^\ell}, \quad \ell \in \{0..m-1\}.$$

(it uses the field equations  $|\mathbf{C}|_{*,T}^q - |\mathbf{C}|_{*,T}$ ).

# COMPLEXITY OF SOLVING THE MAXMINORS MODELING

Solving in the Overdetermined case

$$m \binom{n-k-1}{r} \geq \binom{n}{r} - 1$$

If the equations over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  are “as linearly independent as possible”  $\rightarrow$  independence assumption.

No spurious solution outside the image of the Plücker map 😊.



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- ▶ Hybrid approach to reduce to the overdetermined case;
- ▶ Use relations between the minors? 😞
- ▶ Introduce another set of variables (e.g. **x** or **s**).

## UNDERDET. CASES BARDET, BRIAUD, BROS, ET AL. 2023

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Support Minors modeling over  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$

$$\left\{ Q_I \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{C} \end{pmatrix} \right|_{*,I} : I \subset \{1..n\}, \#I = r + 1 \right\}$$

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# ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT MINORS MODELING OVER $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$

$$\mathcal{Q} = \left\{ Q_l \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{c} \end{pmatrix} \right|_{*,l} : l \subset \{1..n\}, \#l = r+1 \right\}$$
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$\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{x}_i \mathcal{P} : i \in \{1..k\}, \mathcal{Q}_{\geq 2}$  are linearly independent over  $\mathbb{F}_q$

## HINTS OF PROOF

$$\blacktriangleright \left| \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{c} \end{pmatrix} \mathbf{H}_y^\top \right|_{*,T} = 0 + \text{Cauchy-Binet formula} + \text{systematic form} \Rightarrow \mathcal{L}_0 \subset \langle \mathcal{L}_{\geq 1} \rangle.$$

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- ▶ We introduce a monomial ordering and compare leading terms for  $Q_I \in \mathcal{Q}_{\geq 2}$ :

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implies that  $\mathcal{P} \subset \mathcal{Q}_1 + \langle \mathcal{Q}_{\geq 2} \rangle.$

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▶ same idea with another matrix for  $x_j P_j.$

## SOLVING SM OVER $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ : TOO MANY SOLUTIONS

With the equations  $\mathcal{P} + \mathcal{Q}_{\geq 2}$

- ▶ each linear equation  $P_j$  removes a variable  $c_{j+k+1}$  that does not appear in  $\mathcal{Q}_{\geq 2}$ ,
- ▶ we can describe the vector spaces generated by  $\mathcal{Q}_{\geq 2}$  for each bi-degree  $(b, 1)$  in  $(X_i, c_T)$ ,
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But...

- ▶ we can eliminate  $m$  times more variables  $c_j$  by unfolding the  $P_j$ 's!
- ▶ that's  $\text{SM-}\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^+ = \{Q_I : I\} + \{P_{i,J} : i, J\}$ .
- ▶ we analyze the vector spaces generated by the equations in any bi-degree  $(b, 1)$  in  $\mathbf{x}_i, c_T \rightarrow$  syzygies  $\rightarrow$  generic complexity.

# SYZYGIES ANALYSIS IN $SM-\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^+$

► Macaulay matrix at bi-degree  $(b, 1)$ .

► The linear dependencies of the polynomials in  $\mathcal{Q}_0$  come from

$$\left| \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{c} \end{pmatrix} \mathbf{H}_y^\top \right|_{*,T} = 0 \pmod{\langle P_j \rangle}.$$

► With the unfolding, we also have  $\left| \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{c} \end{pmatrix} (\mathbf{H}_y^{q^\ell})^\top \right|_{*,T_1} = 0 \pmod{\langle P_{i,j} \rangle}$ .

► At higher degree,  $\left| \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{xG} + \mathbf{y} \\ \mathbf{c} \end{pmatrix} (\mathbf{H}_y^{q^\ell})^\top \right|_{*,T_2} = 0 \quad (\#T_i = r + i)$ .

# COMPLEXITY OF SOLVING SM- $\mathbb{F}_q^+$


$$\mathcal{N}_b^{\mathbb{F}_q} = \mathcal{N}_b^{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} - \mathcal{N}_{b,\text{syz}}^{\mathbb{F}_q},$$

$$\mathcal{N}_b^{\mathbb{F}_{q^m}} = \sum_{i=1}^k \binom{n-i}{r} \binom{k+b-1-i}{b-1} - \binom{n-k-1}{r} \binom{k+b-1}{b} \quad (\text{exact})$$


$$\mathcal{N}_{b,\text{syz}}^{\mathbb{F}_q} = (m-1) \sum_{i=1}^b (-1)^{i+1} \binom{k+b-i-1}{b-i} \binom{n-k-1}{r+i} \quad (\text{conjecture})$$

$$\mathcal{M}_b^{\mathbb{F}_q} = \binom{k+b-1}{b} \left( \binom{n}{r} - m \binom{n-k-1}{r} \right), \quad (\text{exact})$$


We can solve SM- $\mathbb{F}_q^+$  by linearization at bi-degree  $(b, 1)$  whenever  $\mathcal{N}_b^{\mathbb{F}_q} \geq \mathcal{M}_b^{\mathbb{F}_q} - 1$  with a cost  $\mathcal{O}\left(m^2 \mathcal{N}_b^{\mathbb{F}_q} \mathcal{M}_b^{\mathbb{F}_q} \omega^{-1}\right)$  operations in  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .



**Figure:** Theoretical complexities for  $\text{MM-}\mathbb{F}_q/\text{SM-}\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^+$  (hybrid) and for combinatorial attacks with fixed  $(m, n, k) = (31, 33, 15)$  (RYDE-128).  $d_{\text{RGV}}(m, n, k, q = 2) = 10$ .



**Figure:** Optimal values of  $a$  with  $(m, n, k) = (31, 33, 15)$ , for MM- $\mathbb{F}_q$  and SM- $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}^+$ .



**Figure:** Same parameters as Fig. 1 but with  $q = 2^8$ .

- 1 NIST call for Post-Quantum cryptography
- 2 Algebraic Modeling
- 3 Complexity estimates
- 4 Examples
- 5 Rank metric codes
- 6 MinRank**

# THE MINRANK PROBLEM

- ▶ Input: integers  $r, m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ , and  $K$  matrices  $\mathbf{M}_1, \dots, \mathbf{M}_K \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$
- ▶ Output:  $(x_1, \dots, x_K) \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , not all zero, such that

$$\text{Rank} \left( \sum_{i=1}^K x_i \mathbf{M}_i \right) \leq r.$$



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- ▶  $K < (m - r)(n - r)$ : 0 or 1 solution *in the algebraic closure* of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

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- ▶  $K < (m - r)(n - r)$ : 0 or 1 solution *in the algebraic closure* of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .
- ▶ No need to add the field equations: already in the ideal!
- ▶ For very small  $q$  (e.g.  $q = 2$ ): adding small degree equations can speed up the computation.

MINRANK PROBLEM  $\text{Rank} \left( \mathbf{M}_x \stackrel{\text{DEF}}{=} \sum_{i=1}^K \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{M}_i \right) \leq r$

- ▶ Kipnis-Shamir modeling (Kipnis and Shamir 1999)

$$\mathbf{M}_x \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I}_{n-r} \\ -\mathbf{C} \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{O}_{m \times (n-r)}, \quad \mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{r \times (n-r)}, \mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{F}_q \quad (\text{KS})$$

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- ▶ Minors modeling (J. Faugère, Safey El Din, and Spaenlehauer 2010)

$$\text{Minors}_{r+1}(\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{x}}) = \mathbf{0} \quad (\text{Minors})$$

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$\iff \mathbf{M}_x$  is orthogonal to the code  $(\mathbf{I}_{n-r} \quad -\mathbf{C}^\top)$ , dual  $(\mathbf{C} \quad \mathbf{I}_r)$ .

- ▶ Minors modeling (J. Faugère, Safey El Din, and Spaenlehauer 2010)

$$\text{Minors}_{r+1}(\mathbf{M}_x) = \mathbf{0} \quad (\text{Minors})$$

- ▶ Support Minors modeling, (Bardet, Bros, Cabarcas, et al. 2020)

$$\text{Minors}_{r+1} \left( \begin{pmatrix} (\mathbf{M}_x)_{j,*} \\ \mathbf{C} \quad \mathbf{I}_r \end{pmatrix} \right) = \mathbf{0} \quad \forall j \in \{1..m\}. \quad (\text{SM})$$

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- ▶ Same ideal !  $\langle \text{Minors} \rangle \subset \langle \text{KS} \rangle = \langle \text{SM} \rangle$  (Bardet and Bertin 2022; Guo and Ding 2022).






# CONCLUSION






- ▶ **Algebraic cryptanalysis** is powerful ;
- ▶ importance of the **algebraic modeling**;
- ▶ design **specific algorithms** to be efficient;
- ▶ no general way, new analysis for each new class ;



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