

# Advancements in the Control of Dynamic Matching Markets

Ali Aouad (LBS)

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  - Matching queues: CK ['09], GW ['14], AAGK ['17], TX ['17]...

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Optimization-based matching policies for dynamic processes

- 1 Dynamic arrival/departure process
- 2 Correlated arrival process

# Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time


Joint work with Omer Saritaç (LBS)

# Role of “Timing” in Matching Platforms

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E.g., Car-Pooling <sup>1</sup>

*“Longer initial wait times enabled the app to make more efficient matches”*

<sup>1</sup> Korolko et al. [‘19], HBS case study: The Launch of Express Pool [‘18]


# Contributions—what's coming

- 1 Modeling approach: Dynamic stochastic matching
- 2 Simple provably good matching algorithms
  - New mathematical programming relaxations
  - Threshold policies, online correlated rounding
- 3 Numerical simulations-car-pooling system




# Dynamic Stochastic Matching Model


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


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
2 Market Dynamics

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
# Dynamic Stochastic Matching Model



Abandonment cost:  $c_a(i)$

2 Market Dynamics

# Dynamic Stochastic Matching Model



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Cost Minimization Problem

$$\inf_{\pi} \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}[C^{\pi}(t)]}{t}$$

Reward Maximization Problem

$$\sup_{\pi} \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}[R^{\pi}(t)]}{t}$$

# Classical Matching vs. Dynamic Matching

	"Classical" Online Matching	Our Setting
When agents arrive?	Online/Offline	Dynamic (Poisson)
When to match?	Immediately	Stopping time problem
Horizon?	Finite	Steady-state (avg. cost)




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<i>Algorithm design?</i>	Competitive algorithms	?

# Performance of Batching Policies?


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


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*Proof construction:*



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- Decision variable:  $x_{i,j}$  match rate of **active type-i** with **passive type-j** vertices

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$$L^* = \min_{x_{i,j}, x_{i,a} \geq 0} \sum_i c_a(i) \cdot x_{i,a} + \sum_{(i,j)} c(i,j) \cdot x_{i,j}$$



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"Minimal" level abandonment

# Performance Metrics (Refresher)

- Competitive Ratio: Performance relative to “**optimum offline**”

$$\max_{\mathcal{I}} \frac{c^{\text{alg}}(\mathcal{I})}{c^{\text{off}}(\mathcal{I})} \quad \left. \vphantom{\max_{\mathcal{I}}} \right\} \text{Benchmark knows all arrivals and sojourn times!}$$

- Approximation Ratio: Performance relative to “**optimum online**”

$$\max_{\mathcal{I}} \frac{c^{\text{alg}}(\mathcal{I})}{c^*(\mathcal{I})} \quad \left. \vphantom{\max_{\mathcal{I}}} \right\} \text{Realistic benchmark} \\ = \text{best implementable policy}$$

# Value of Dynamic Information

- Approximation Ratio: Relative performance vs. **optimal policy**
- Competitive Ratio: Relative performance vs. **full-information policy**

**Informal Theorem [A. and Saritac '20]:** For the min-cost problem, no algorithm achieves a positive constant-factor competitive ratio.

# Approximation Result for Cost-Minimization

**Spatial graphs:** The costs  $\{c(i, j), c_a(i)\}_{i,j}$  satisfy the triangle inequality



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
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Matching policy: **threshold-based** or **additive-approximation** of value function




# Auxiliary Stopping Time Problem

Focus on a **single active** vertex (ignore competition)



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Optimal stopping rule  $T$

Lem. [A. and Saritac '20]: The optimal stopping rule is **threshold-based**. The optimal threshold  $\bar{c}_i$  is **independent of the current state** and can be computed in polynomial-time.





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# Empirical Simulation---NY Taxi Demand

- We focus on four time windows that represents various market conditions
- Split the data into training and test sets
  - Define rider types and estimate their arrival rates

Day of week	Time of day	Number of types $ \mathcal{T} $	Sample size	
			Training set	Test set
Monday	7:30 AM - 8:00 AM	272	50988	9022
	11:00 AM - 11:30 AM	272	48484	7064
Saturday	7:30 AM - 8:00 AM	218	15036	2535
	5:30 AM - 6:00 PM	307	70035	10275

*Table: Summary statistics of the data set generated for each time window*



# Performance Metrics

Total Cost is an affine function of the two performance metrics

- **Match Rate:** Percentage of riders matched
- **Saving Rate:** Percentage of trip costs saved by pooling

$$\text{Total Cost} = \alpha - \beta_1 \cdot \text{Match Rate} - \beta_2 \cdot \text{Saving Rate}$$

# Numerical Results



Match rate = % matched before abandoning

Saving rate = % cost saved by pooling riders

# Main Result for General Networks

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**Theorem 2 [A. and Saritac '20]:** The **reward maximization** dynamic matching problem admits efficient constant-factor approximations:

- On general graphs, the approximation ratio is  $\frac{1}{4} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)$ .
- On bipartite graphs, the approximation ratio is  $\frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)$ .
- On bipartite graphs with one impatient side, the approximation ratio is  $\left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)$ .

Our policy is **a correlated rounding of the LP relaxation**.

# LP Rounding Algorithm

Step 1: Solve a flow matching problem ("fluid relaxation")

Step 2: Randomization based on fractional flow ("rounding")

# LP Rounding Algorithm


Step 1: Solve a variant of our **LP relaxation**

Step 2: **Flexible randomization** based on fractional flow




# Role of Pooling Effects

Thought experiment...




# Role of Pooling Effects




By pooling A + B, we can minimize  
waiting times + abandonments

# Step 1: Flexible Randomization



Active vertices



Passive vertices



# Step 1: Flexible Randomization



# Analysis outline


1. Flow decomposition : each arrival  $\rightarrow$  randomly assigned "active" or "passive" and "compatibility set"
2. Lower bound on the availability rates of active types: virtual Markov chain
3. PASTA property: relating the lower bound on reward rates to original LP solution

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
## Step 2: Lower bound via virtual Markov chain

"True" Markov chain




# Step 2: Lower bound via virtual Markov chain

"True" Markov chain



"Virtual" Markov chain



*Create virtual copies of passive vertices to satisfy all active vertices*



# A Nonparametric Framework for Online Stochastic Matching with **Correlated Arrivals**

Joint work with Will Ma (Columbia GSB)

# Outline


- 1 Nonparametric models with correlated arrivals
- 2 New matching algorithms with optimal competitive/approximation ratios

# Classic offline/online model

bipartite graph:


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


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
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
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
arrival process:




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
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


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




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



arrival process:



# Classic offline/online model

arrival process:



serial independence  
(i.e., no correlations)


# Limitations of “serial independence” assumption

- Estimation error  $T, \mathbf{p}_t$

# Classic offline/online model

$$D_j \sim \text{PoissonB}(p_{1,j}, p_{2,j}, \dots)$$

arrival process:




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$$\text{Var}(D_j) \leq \mathbb{E}[D_j]$$

arrival process:



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
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- Estimation error  $T, \mathbf{p}_t$
- Textbook demand models, e.g., Gaussian
- A majority (70%+) of high-demand SKUs violate  $\text{Var}(D_j) \leq \text{E}[D_j]$ 
  - JD.com e-commerce order data (M&SOM 2020)
  - Large fashion retailer (2014-2015 data), 200,000 SKUs

# $\text{Var}(D_j) < E[D_j]$ is unreasonably optimistic

JD.com Data<sup>1</sup>




<sup>1</sup>Largest 40x40 (SKU,location) pairs, weekly level aggregates<sup>1</sup> (March 2018)



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
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Order fulfilment data<sup>1</sup>

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
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
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
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- 1 Nonparametric models with correlated arrivals
- 2 New matching algorithms with optimal competitive/approximation ratios

# Nonparametric models



- serial independence assumption
- modelling the arrival process (t)




# Nonparametric models

## INDEP model

- Each type-demand  $D_j$  follows an arbitrary (known) distribution
- But type-demands are independent  
 $D_j \perp\!\!\!\perp D_k$

E.g., independent regions




# Nonparametric models

## CORREL model

- The total demand  $D = \sum D_j$  follows an arbitrary (known) distribution
- Conditional on  $T = D$ , the  $t$ -th query type independently sampled from  $\mathbf{p}_t$

E.g., common shock across regions





# Outline

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  - Tighter polyhedral relaxations ( $\neq$  fluid relaxation)
  - Lossless rounding scheme

# LP benchmark for INDEP


$$\begin{aligned} \text{LP}^{\text{fluid}} = \max_x \quad & \sum_{i,j} r_{i,j} x_{i,j} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_i x_{i,j} \leq k_i \\ & \sum_j x_{i,j} \leq \mathbb{E}[D_j] \\ & x_{i,j} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

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
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S: subset of resources;  
Hall's marriage condition  
and taking expectations

$$\forall j, S \subseteq [n]$$

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Proposition [A., Ma '22]: Valid benchmark  $\text{LP}^{\text{trunc}} \geq \text{OFF}$

Proposition [A., Ma '22]:  $\text{LP}^{\text{trunc}}$  is solvable in polynomial time (polymatroid constraints).

# Main results – INDEP

Theorem [A., Ma, Zhang '23]: For INDEP, there is no matching policy better than  $1/2$ -competitive even under **large inventory and uniform arrivals**.

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
Theorem [A., Ma '23]: For INDEP, there exists a  $1/2$ -competitive matching policy (against our LP) that is computed in polynomial time, even under adversarial arrivals.

*Proof idea:*

**Reduction to single-offline node prophet inequality via lossless rounding**

# The central rounding lemma

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LP}^{\text{fluid}} = \max_x \quad & \sum_t \sum_{i,j} r_{i,j} x_{i,j}^t \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_i \sum_t x_{i,j}^t \leq k_i \\ & \sum_j x_{i,j}^t \leq \theta_{t,j} \end{aligned}$$



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Lemma [A., Ma '22]: There exists a **lossless rounding** for  $\text{LP}^{\text{trunc}}$  for each type  $j$

$$\Pr_{\pi \sim \lambda_j} \left[ \sum_{\ell} \mathbb{I}[\pi(\ell) = i] \cdot \Pr[D_j \geq \ell] \right] = x_{i,j}^*$$

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For any fixed type demand distribution, the LP fractional solutions represents all achievable match rates to the  $m$  resources

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
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# Rounding lemma

- E.g., nonparametric demand  $\Pr [D_j \geq \ell] = 1/2^{\ell-1}$  with  $\ell = 1, \dots, 4$
- Feasible fractional matching:  $x_j^* = \left(\frac{1}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{7}{8} + \epsilon\right)$
- Binding constraints:

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} \frac{7}{8} + \epsilon \leq \mathbb{E}[\min\{D_j, 1\}] = 1 \\ \frac{11}{8} + \epsilon \leq \mathbb{E}[\min\{D_j, 2\}] = \frac{3}{2} \\ \frac{13}{8} + \epsilon \leq \mathbb{E}[\min\{D_j, 3\}] = \frac{7}{4} \end{array} \right.$$

# Rounding lemma




$$x_j^* = \left( \frac{1}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{7}{8} + \epsilon \right)$$

 null query

# Rounding lemma

$$\Pr[D_j \geq \ell] = 1/2^{\ell-1}$$

Which query is routed to resource 1?




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$$\Pr[D_j \geq \ell] = 1/2^{\ell-1}$$

Which query is routed to resource 1? Greedy?



$$x_j^* = \left( \frac{1}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{7}{8} + \epsilon \right)$$

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
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$$\Pr[D_j \geq \ell] = 1/2^{\ell-1}$$

Which query is routed to resource 1? Greedy? ☹️



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
 null query

 routed query

# Rounding lemma

$$\Pr[D_j \geq \ell] = 1/2^{\ell-1}$$

Which query is routed to resource 1? Proportional? ☹️



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
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 routed query

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
 null query

 routed query

# Rounding lemma

$$\Pr[D_j \geq \ell] = 1/2^{\ell-1}$$

Which query is routed to resource 2?



$$x_j^* = \left( \frac{1}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{7}{8} + \epsilon \right)$$


 null query

 routed query



# Rounding lemma

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
Which query is routed to resource 2?



$$x_j^* = \left( \frac{1}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{7}{8} + \epsilon \right)$$

 null query  
 routed query

# Rounding lemma



# Concluding remarks

- Common principles
  - Limitations of fluid relaxation for more rich stochastic matching problems
  - Tighter LP relaxations: more closely approximating the online/offline optimum
  - “Attainability” results: contention resolution or correlated roundings
- Open questions & future directions
  - Breaching  $(1-1/e)$ -approximation for dynamic matching
  - Sample complexity of nonparametric stochastic models
  - Other models of correlation: e.g., prediction uncertainty

# Main results – CORREL

Observation [A., Ma '22]: For CORREL, no constant-factor competitive ratio is achievable.

Theorem [A., Ma '22]: For CORREL, there exists an approximate matching policy that achieving an approximation ratio  $\gamma_k^* > (1 + \sqrt{k})^{-1}$ , where  $\gamma_k^*$  is the best-known competitive ratio for k-unit prophet inequality.


*Proof ideas:*

- Conditional LP: valid inequalities conditional on the largest arrival sequence length
- Reduction to online contention resolution scheme [Jiang, Ma, and Zhang, 22]



# Conditional LP

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$$\begin{aligned} \text{LP}^{\text{cond}} = \max_x \quad & \sum_t \sum_{i,j} r_{i,j} x_{i,j}^t \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_i \sum_t \frac{1}{\Pr[D \geq t]} \cdot x_{i,j}^t \leq k_i \\ & \sum_j \frac{1}{\Pr[D \geq t]} \cdot x_{i,j}^t \leq \theta_{t,j} \end{aligned}$$

Intuition: "the tightest constraints are given by the largest possible demand"