

# Differential Privacy for Decentralized Optimization

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- 1 Privacy, Differential Privacy and Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
- 2 Network Differential Privacy
- 3 Private Random Walks
- 4 Gossip algorithms

# Why Privacy?

## Right to be left alone [Warren and Brandeis 1890]

The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.

- New technologies that force us to rethink privacy: broader scope of surveillance, improvement of data mining and make the intrusion invisible [Snowden 2019]
- Technical implementation are the Missing Masses of our social changes, compared to other agents, such as legal requirement (GDPR [Conseil 2016]), public opinion, financial incentive.

# Privacy 2.0: High Dimension Data destroy anonymity




Figure 1: De-anonymization: adversary knows exact ratings and approximate dates.

- Large anonymized database published for the Netflix Prize
- Joint with the MovieLens dataset, users who are in both datasets have high probability of re-identification
- Leaks sensitive private rankings (political movies, sexual preferences, religious belief, ...)


# Machine Learning Models Privacy Leakage

LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION.  
OUR NEXT MEETING WILL BE  
AT THE DOCKS AT MIDNIGHT  
ON JUNE 28 TAB


AHA, FOUND THEM!



WHEN YOU TRAIN PREDICTIVE MODELS  
ON INPUT FROM YOUR USERS, IT CAN  
LEAK INFORMATION IN UNEXPECTED WAYS.




# Attacks on Machine Learning models




- Young and active research field, better attacks yet to come
- Various dangers: membership inference, attribute inference, full reconstruction attacks
- Various threat models: white/black box model, passive/active, computational power, auxiliary information...

# From binary to stochastic privacy


- Not private or non-private, but a probability to leak information
- Differential Privacy only tackles the risk of leakage in algorithms outputs
- It enforces constraints on how much a single instance can influence outputs through noise injection




# Ultimate goal: good utility *and* privacy



# Differential privacy Intuition



- Neighboring datasets  $\mathcal{D} = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$  and  $\mathcal{D}' = \{x_1, x'_2, x_3, \dots, x_n\}$
- **Requirement:**  $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D})$  and  $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}')$  should have “similar” distributions



# Differential Privacy

## Definition

Let  $\varepsilon \geq 0$  and  $\delta \in [0, 1]$ . A mechanism,  $\mathcal{M}$  is  $\varepsilon$ -differentially private with respect to  $\sim$  if for every pair of databases  $X \sim X'$  and every subset  $\mathcal{S} \subset Z$ :

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(X) \in \mathcal{S}) \leq \exp(\varepsilon)\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(X') \in \mathcal{S}) + \delta$$

- Robust to post-processing
- Based on the protection of the participation
- Sensitive to the definition of adjacency
- Sensitive to the outputs of the mechanism

# Rényi Differential Privacy

## Rényi Differential Privacy [Mironov 2017]

An algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $(\alpha, \varepsilon)$ -Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP) for  $\alpha > 1$  and  $\varepsilon > 0$  if for all pairs of neighboring datasets  $\mathcal{D} \sim \mathcal{D}'$ :

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}) \parallel \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}')) \leq \varepsilon, \quad (1)$$


where for two r.v.  $X, Y$  with densities  $\mu_X, \mu_Y$ ,  $D_\alpha(X \parallel Y)$  is the Rényi divergence of order  $\alpha$ :

$$D_\alpha(X \parallel Y) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \ln \int \left( \frac{\mu_X(z)}{\mu_Y(z)} \right)^\alpha \mu_Y(z) dz.$$

- Conversion to  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -DP:  $(\alpha, \varepsilon)$ -RDP implies  $(\varepsilon + \frac{\ln(1/\delta)}{\alpha-1}, \delta)$ -DP for any  $\delta \in (0, 1)$
- Composition: if  $\mathcal{A}_1$  is  $(\alpha, \varepsilon_1)$ -RDP and  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is  $(\alpha, \varepsilon_2)$ -RDP, then  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  is  $(\alpha, \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2)$ -RDP
- If  $\sup_{\mathcal{D} \sim \mathcal{D}'} \|f(\mathcal{D}) - f(\mathcal{D}')\| \leq \Delta$ ;  $\mathcal{A}(\cdot) = f(\cdot) + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 \Delta^2)$  is  $(\alpha, \frac{\alpha}{2\sigma^2})$ -RDP for any  $\alpha > 1$

# Local or Central DP


## Centralized DP



More privacy




## Local DP



# Local or Central DP

## Centralized DP




More privacy




Less utility

## Local DP



# Local or Central DP

## Centralized DP





More privacy



Less utility

## Local DP



# Differentially Private SGD

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**Algorithm 1** Differentially Private SGD (DP-SGD) [Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta 2014; Abadi et al. 2016]

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Initialize  $\theta^{(0)} \in \mathbb{R}^p$  (must be independent of  $\mathcal{D}$ )

**for**  $t = 0, \dots, T - 1$  **do**

    Pick  $i_t \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  uniformly at random

$\eta^{(t)} \leftarrow (\eta_1^{(t)}, \dots, \eta_p^{(t)}) \in \mathbb{R}^p$  where each  $\eta_j^{(t)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 \Delta^2)$

$\theta^{(t+1)} \leftarrow \theta^{(t)} - \gamma^{(t)} (\nabla \ell(\theta^{(t)}; x_{i_t}, y_{i_t}) + \eta^{(t)})$

Return  $\theta^{(T)}$

---

- The sensitivity  $\Delta = \sup_{\theta} \sup_{x, y, x', y'} \|\nabla \ell(\theta^{(t)}; x, y) - \nabla \ell(\theta^{(t)}; x', y')\|$  can be controlled by assuming  $\ell(\cdot; x, y)$  Lipschitz for all  $x, y$ , or using gradient clipping [Abadi et al. 2016] straightforward
- More data (larger  $n$ )  $\rightarrow$  less noise added to each gradient
- More iterations (larger  $T$ )  $\rightarrow$  more noise added to each gradient

## Privacy-utility trade-off of DP-SGD

- **Utility analysis:** same as non-private SGD (with additional noise due to privacy)
- **Privacy analysis:** DP-SGD is  $(\alpha, \frac{\alpha}{2n^2\sigma^2})$  by subsampled Gaussian mechanism + composition of RDP
  - Note: if one only releases the last iterate, recent refined analysis (e.g., based on Langevin diffusion) show convergence in  $T$  of the privacy loss
- In any case, setting  $\sigma^2$  to satisfy  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP and choosing  $T$  to balance optimization and privacy errors, we get the following suboptimality gap:

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Convex, Lipschitz, smooth loss	$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\sqrt{p} \ln(1/\delta)}{n\epsilon}\right)$
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
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Convex, Lipschitz, smooth loss, strongly convex $F$	$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{p \ln(1/\delta)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}\right)$
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
- This is optimal [Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta 2014]: cannot do better without additional assumptions

## Decentralized algorithms: good for privacy?




- Decentralized optimization algorithms like decentralized SGD [Lian et al. 2017] [Koloskova et al. 2020] are increasingly popular in ML due to their scalability

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
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- Folklore: “Decentralized algorithms are good for privacy”

## Decentralized algorithms: good for privacy?



- Decentralized optimization algorithms like decentralized SGD [Lian et al. 2017] [Koloskova et al. 2020] are increasingly popular in ML due to their scalability
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- Question: can we formalize and quantify this gain?

## Decentralized algorithms: good for privacy?



- Decentralized optimization algorithms like decentralized SGD [Lian et al. 2017] [Koloskova et al. 2020] are increasingly popular in ML due to their scalability
- Folklore: “Decentralized algorithms are good for privacy”
- Question: can we formalize and quantify this gain? **Yes!**

# Definition of Network Differential Privacy

- Graph of  $n$  nodes with edges for communication
- Private database  $D_u$  (several contributions for a fixed  $u$ )
- Define the observations  $\mathcal{O}_v$  of a node  $u$

## Network Differential Privacy

An algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -network DP if for all pairs of distinct users  $u, v \in V$  and all pairs of datasets  $D \sim_u D'$ , we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{O}_v(\mathcal{A}(D))) \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{O}_v(\mathcal{A}(D'))) + \delta.$$

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# Network Pairwise Differential Privacy

- We will also consider **privacy guarantees** that are specific to each pair of nodes, rather than uniform over all pairs


Definition (Pairwise Network DP [Cyffers et al. 2022])

For  $f : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ , an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $(\alpha, f)$ -Pairwise Network DP (PNDP) if for all pairs of distinct users  $u, v \in \mathcal{V}$  and neighboring datasets  $\mathcal{D} \sim_u \mathcal{D}'$ :

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{O}_v(\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D})) \parallel \mathcal{O}_v(\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}')))) \leq f(u, v). \quad (2)$$

- For comparison with central and local DP baselines, we will report the **mean privacy loss**  $\bar{\epsilon}_v = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{v\}} f(u, v)$  under the constraint  $\bar{\epsilon} = \max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \bar{\epsilon}_v \leq \epsilon$
- Note:  $\bar{\epsilon}_v$  is not a proper privacy guarantee (we simply use it to summarize our gains)


# Toy example: Case of a Ring Network



## Real Aggregation

- Same privacy-utility trade-off as a *trusted aggregator*
- Gain of  $O(1/\sqrt{n})$  compared to LDP


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## Histogram computation

- keeps trace of the multiset of answers
- amplification by shuffling
- Gain of  $\mathcal{O}_\delta(1/\sqrt{n})$  compared to LDP

# Private Random walk-based Decentralized SGD

- Consider the standard objective  $F(\theta; \mathcal{D}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{v=1}^n F_v(\theta; \mathcal{D}_v)$
- We consider a decentralized SGD algorithm where the model is updated sequentially by following a random walk, aka incremental gradient [B. Johansson, Rabi, and M. Johansson 2009]

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**Algorithm 2** Private random walk-based SGD [Cyffers2022a]

---

Initialize  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^p$

**for**  $t = 1$  to  $T$  **do**

    Draw random user  $v \sim \mathcal{U}(1, \dots, n)$

$\eta = [\eta_1, \dots, \eta_p]$ , where each  $\eta_j \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 \Delta^2)$

$\theta \leftarrow \theta - \gamma[\nabla_{\theta} F_v(\theta; \mathcal{D}_v) + \eta]$

**return**  $\theta$

---

# Privacy amplification for walk-based SGD





## Theorem ([Cyffers2022a], informal)

Let  $F_1(\cdot; \mathcal{D}_1), \dots, F_n(\cdot; \mathcal{D}_n)$  be convex and smooth. Given  $\alpha > 1$ ,  $\varepsilon > 0$ , let  $T = \tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$  and  $\sigma^2$  be such that private random walk-based decentralized SGD on the complete graph satisfies  $(\alpha, \varepsilon)$ -local RDP. Then the algorithm also satisfies  $(\alpha, \frac{\ln^2 n}{n} \varepsilon)$ -network DP.

- With NDP, we recover the privacy-utility trade-off of DP-SGD under central DP up to a log factor
- For  $T = o(n^2)$ , the amplification effect is still strong and can be computed numerically
- Utility analysis: same as DP-SGD
- Privacy analysis: leverages privacy amplification by iteration [Feldman18] and exploits the randomness of the walk through “weak convexity” of Rényi divergence
- We show some robustness to collusion (albeit with smaller privacy amplification)

## Case of a Complete graph - SGD

- The amplification by decentralization lead to significant utility gains.
- Experiments with  $\sigma$  set to ensure  $\epsilon = 10$  (left) or  $\epsilon = 1$  (right) and  $\delta = 10^{-6}$ .



## Ongoing work: arbitrary graphs

- Let  $W$  be a bistochastic matrix encoding the transitions of the random walk and consider Pairwise Network DP
- The privacy is composed of a global term corresponding to the complete graph and a constant graph-dependent factor.


### Theorem (Privacy loss for RW in arbitrary graph (informal))

Let  $\alpha > 1$ ,  $\varepsilon > 0$  and  $\sigma^2$  be such that the RW DP-SGD on the graph of adjacency matrix  $W$  is  $(\alpha, \varepsilon)$ -local RDP for a step. After  $T$  (large enough) steps, the algorithm is  $(\alpha, f)$ -PNDP for

$$f(u, v) \leq \frac{CT}{n\varepsilon} \left( \frac{\ln(T)}{n} - \ln(I - W + \frac{1}{n}\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^\top)_{uv} \right)$$

- Interpretation as leakage within communities? Relative importance of the two terms  $\rightarrow$  requires tight bounds on RW mixing times.

# Gossip protocols




---

**Algorithm 3** Gossip\_Averaging( $\{x_v\}_{v \in \mathcal{V}}, W, K$ )

---

**for all nodes  $v$  in parallel do**

$$x_v^0 \leftarrow x_v$$

**for  $k = 0$  to  $K - 1$  do**

**for all nodes  $v$  in parallel do**

$$x_v^{k+1} \leftarrow \sum_{w \in \mathcal{N}_v} W_{v,w} x_w^k, \quad \text{where } \mathcal{N}_v = \{w : W_{v,w} > 0\}$$

**return**  $x_1^K, \dots, x_n^K$

---

- Random walk-based SGD is sequential (no parallel computation)
- A popular parallel alternative is gossip-based decentralized SGD [Lian et al. 2017] [Koloskova et al. 2020], which builds upon gossip averaging [Boyd et al. 2006]

# Gossip-based Decentralized SGD

- Consider again  $F(\theta; \mathcal{D}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{v=1}^n F_v(\theta; \mathcal{D}_v)$  with  $F_v(\theta; \mathcal{D}_v) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_v|} \sum_{(x_v, y_v) \in \mathcal{D}_v} \ell(\theta; x_v, y_v)$

---

## Algorithm 4 Gossip-based decentralized SGD

---

Initialize  $\theta_1^{(0)}, \dots, \theta_n^{(0)} \in \mathbb{R}^p$

**for**  $t = 0$  to  $T - 1$  **do**

**for** all nodes  $v$  in parallel **do**

$\hat{\theta}_v^t \leftarrow \theta_v^t - \gamma \nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta_v^t; x_v^t, y_v^t)$  where  $(x_v^t, y_v^t) \sim \mathcal{D}_v$

$\theta_v^{t+1} \leftarrow \text{Gossip\_Averaging}(\{\hat{\theta}_v^t\}_{v \in \mathcal{V}}, W, K)$

**return**  $\theta_1^T, \dots, \theta_n^T$

---

- To improve the dependence on the topology in the convergence rate we actually use accelerated gossip [Berthier, Bach, and Gaillard 2020]

# Private Gossip-based Decentralized SGD

- To make the algorithm private, we add Gaussian noise before gossiping

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**Algorithm 5** Muffliato( $\{x_v\}_{v \in \mathcal{V}}, W, K, \sigma^2$ )

---

**for** all nodes  $v$  in parallel **do**

$\tilde{x}_v^0 \leftarrow x_v + \eta_v$  where  $\eta_v \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$

$x_1^K, \dots, x_n^K \leftarrow \text{Gossip\_Averaging}(\{\tilde{x}_v^0\}_{v \in \mathcal{V}}, W, K)$

**return**  $x_1^K, \dots, x_n^K$

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**Algorithm 6** Private gossip-based decentralized SGD

---

Initialize  $\theta_1^{(0)}, \dots, \theta_n^{(0)} \in \mathbb{R}^p$

**for**  $t = 0$  to  $T - 1$  **do**

**for** all nodes  $v$  in parallel **do**

$\hat{\theta}_v^t \leftarrow \theta_v^t - \gamma \nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta_v^t; x_v^t, y_v^t)$  where  $(x_v^t, y_v^t) \sim \mathcal{D}_v$

$\theta_v^{t+1} \leftarrow \text{Muffliato}(\{\hat{\theta}_v^t\}_{v \in \mathcal{V}}, W, K, \nu^2 \sigma^2)$

**return**  $\theta_1^T, \dots, \theta_n^T$

---

# Privacy-utility analysis of Private Gossip Averaging

Theorem ([Cyffers et al. 2022])

After  $K$  iterations, Private Gossip Averaging is  $(\alpha, f)$ -PNDP with

$$\begin{aligned}
 f(u, v) &= \frac{\alpha \Delta^2}{2\sigma^2} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \sum_{w: \{v, w\} \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{(W^k)_{u, w}^2}{\|(W^k)_{w, :}\|^2} \\
 &\leq \frac{\alpha \Delta^2 n}{2\sigma^2} \max_{\{v, w\} \in \mathcal{E}} W_{v, w}^{-2} \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{P}(X^k = v | X^0 = u)^2,
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $(X^k)_k$  is the random walk on graph  $G$ , with transitions  $W$ .

- As desired, this exhibits the fact that, for two nodes  $u$  and  $v$ , privacy guarantees improve with their “distance” in the graph

# Privacy-utility analysis of Private Gossip Averaging

## Theorem ([Cyffers et al. 2022])

Let  $\lambda_W$  be the spectral gap of  $W$ . Private Gossip Averaging verifies, for any  $t \geq T^{\text{stop}}$ :

$$\frac{1}{2n} \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \mathbb{E}[\|x_v^t - \bar{x}\|^2] \leq \frac{3\sigma^2}{n}$$

with:

$$T^{\text{stop}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\lambda_W}} \ln \left( \frac{n}{\sigma^2} \max \left( \sigma^2, \frac{1}{n} \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \|x_v - \bar{x}\|^2 \right) \right).$$

- There is an incompressible error due to noise so it is useless to run gossip averaging for too long

# Privacy-utility analysis

- Recall central DP achieves  $\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{2n^2\epsilon}$  and local DP achieves  $\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{2n\epsilon}$

# Privacy-utility analysis

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- Combining the two previous results and setting the mean privacy loss  $\bar{\varepsilon}_v = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{v\}} f(u, v)$  to satisfy  $\bar{\varepsilon} = \max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \bar{\varepsilon}_v \leq \varepsilon$ , we get (ignoring log terms):

<b>Graph</b>	Arbitrary
<b>Utility</b>	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2 d}{n^2\varepsilon\sqrt{\lambda_W}}$

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Graph	Arbitrary	Complete
Utility	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2 d}{n^2\varepsilon\sqrt{\lambda_W}}$	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{n\varepsilon}$

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Graph	Arbitrary	Complete	Ring
Utility	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2 d}{n^2\varepsilon\sqrt{\lambda_W}}$	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{n\varepsilon}$	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{n\varepsilon}$

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Graph	Arbitrary	Complete	Ring	D-Torus
Utility	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2 d}{n^2\varepsilon\sqrt{\lambda_W}}$	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{n\varepsilon}$	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2}{n\varepsilon}$	$\frac{\alpha\Delta^2 D}{n^{2-1/D}\varepsilon}$

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Graph	Arbitrary	Complete	Ring	D-Torus	Expander
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- Note: we also have extensions to **time-varying graphs** and **randomized gossip**

# Gossip-based Decentralized SGD

## Theorem ([Cyffers et al. 2022])


Let  $F$  be  $\mu$ -strongly convex,  $F_v$  be  $L$ -smooth and  $\mathbb{E}[\|\nabla\ell(\theta^*; x_v, y_v) - \nabla F(\theta^*)\|^2] \leq \rho_v^2$ . Let  $\bar{\rho}^2 = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \rho_v^2$ . For any  $\varepsilon > 0$ , and appropriate choices of  $T$  and  $K$ , there exists  $f$  such that the algorithm is  $(\alpha, f)$ -PNDP, with:

$$\forall v \in \mathcal{V}, \quad \bar{\varepsilon}_v \leq \varepsilon \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}[F(\bar{\theta}^{1:T}) - F(\theta^*)] \leq \tilde{O} \left( \frac{\alpha \Delta^2 d_v}{n \mu \varepsilon \sqrt{\lambda_W}} + \frac{\bar{\rho}^2}{nL} \right),$$

where  $d_v$  is the degree of node  $v$  and  $\lambda_W$  is the spectral gap associated with  $W$ .

- The term  $\frac{\bar{\rho}^2}{nL}$  is privacy-independent and dominated by the first term
- The first term has the same form as before, so same conclusions apply

# Muffliato – experimental results



Left: pairwise NDP loss on synthetic graphs Middle: Privacy loss of *Muffliato* from a node chosen at random on a Facebook ego graph Right: Privacy loss and utility of *Muffliato*-GD compared to a baseline based on a trusted aggregator.

# Conclusion & Perspectives

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## Future work

- Privacy and utility guarantees for random walk-based decentralized SGD on arbitrary graphs [B. Johansson, Rabi, and M. Johansson 2009], possibly with multiple parallel walks [Hendrikx2022a]
- Capturing the redundancy in gossip-based communication (i.e., correlated noise) to further improve privacy guarantees
- Fair comparison between random-walk and gossip algorithms
- Lower bounds on privacy loss.