

AN EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICAL MODEL FOR CORRUPTION CYCLES IN DEMOCRATIC STATES

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ABSTRACT. In this paper we propose a game theoretic model with three populations, namely a government, officials who serve the state, and citizens, to analyse the evolution of corruption in a society. The influence of democracy in corruption is modelled through the action of the citizens who exercise influence in the government because of their elective power since corruption causes a great displeasure in the citizens which can result in a vote against a ruler elite that promotes or is an accomplice to corruption. When immersed in a society in which corruption is a common occurrence, citizens may behave in a complacent manner with corruption because of a lack of valid alternatives to this behaviour even if they oppose corruption. Indeed, this complacent behaviour may also be observed in democratic societies and can lead to periods of growing and diminishing corruption. We are thus able to get a better understanding of some causes for the evolution of corruption and how the evolution may be halted and the effects of democracy and influence in this.

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